Translaboration as legitimation of philosophical translation

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Even highly regarded translators cannot escape the common suspicion that philosophical ideas are not communicable in foreign languages – a suspicion that plagues philosophical translation. Translators effectively counter this distrust of translation when they explicitly claim to have collaborated with the author. This paper focuses on the Italian translation of *Sein und Zeit* (*Being and Time*) (first published in 1927; Heidegger 1986a), titled *Essere e tempo* (Heidegger 2006, trans. Marini), whose translator, Alfredo Marini, took particularly interesting measures to legitimate his work. This case is especially intriguing because Pietro Chiodi’s earlier translation (Heidegger 1953, 1976, 2005) is still popular in Italy despite Chiodi’s own complaints that the German text is untranslatable. The widespread acceptance of the earlier Italian translation presents a considerable problem of legitimation for Marini, who counters Chiodi’s views by arguing for the translatability of the text and supports his argument through a rhetorically constructed scene of collaborative translation. I begin this paper by retracing Marini’s strategy for presenting *Essere e tempo* (Heidegger 2006, trans. Marini) as a ‘translaboration’ (a collaborative translation), before addressing concerns that collaborative translation could hinder the translator’s creativity. I show that Marini’s translation achieves its most creative, and at times eccentric, effects through his close collaboration with the (deceased) philosopher, Martin Heidegger.

**Keywords:** philosophical translation, translaboration, Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*

1. Introduction

Like literature, philosophy traditionally belongs among those genres in which translators can both accrue great prestige and incur great suspicion. Several recent collaborative projects involving eminent philosophers (see, e.g., Papenfuss and
Pöggeler 1992; Hirsch 1997; Cassin 2004) have focused on acknowledging the complexity of translating philosophical texts and the need to pay scholarly and historical attention to these translations. Further evidence of such acknowledgement can also be found in the growing number of translation-themed philosophy conferences and in the recent publication of a handbook on the relationship between philosophy and translation by Rawling and Wilson (2019). Yet what exactly is being honored when translations of philosophical texts are held in high regard? The discipline of philosophy recognizes translation for its dissemination function: translation facilitates participation in discourses across linguistic barriers and supports the circulation of knowledge developed in foreign contexts, thus promoting innovation within discursive traditions. However, suspicion seems to run deeper than appreciation in many philosophers’ judgments of the communicability of translation.

Mistrust of translation is often expressed by means of pejorative metaphors, such as the “deformation” (Schneider 1999, 144), “disfigurement” (143, 145) or even “destruction” (147) of the original. Such descriptions are grounded in a Romantic conviction whose influence on the development of theoretical reflections on the translation of philosophical texts cannot be underestimated: the conviction that philosophical thought does not exist independently of its linguistic form. According to this logic, reformulating a thought necessarily distorts it, or, at the very least, hampers its communication. This assumption is a theoretical springboard for building arguments for untranslatability, a notion which has enjoyed widespread popularity especially with regard to the translation of philosophers as linguistically extravagant as Martin Heidegger. In fact, hardly any other philosopher has provoked so many of his translators to write experiential accounts of their work (see, e.g., Ciocan 2005), and there is hardly a Heidegger translator who has not complained about the untranslatability of Heidegger’s work. Zychlinski (2006, 180) speaks for frustrated translators worldwide when he declares that Heidegger is “hell for translators.”

However, the “traduttore lamentoso” (plaintive translator) (Marini 2002), whose lament has accompanied the international reception of Heidegger since the first translation, can today no longer expect to be met with the same unanimous sympathy as received in the past. At least not in Italy. In 2006, fifty-three years after Pietro Chiodi published the first Italian translation of Sein und Zeit, Alfredo Marini published a new translation and upended Chiodi’s famil-

1. The recognition of the value of translation among philosophers should be unsurprising given that many renowned philosophers, such as Cicero, Boethius, Schleiermacher, Heidegger and Waldenfels, have engaged in translation themselves.
2. Translated by Spencer Hawkins (S.H.).
iar lament in his “Glossario” to *Essere e tempo* (Chiodi 1976, 541) that “we have reached the limits of translatability” by claiming that *Sein und Zeit* actually invites translation into Italian (Marini 2006a, 1265). If *Sein und Zeit* has been an international scandal for translation, Marini’s *Essere e tempo* (Heidegger 2006, trans. Marini) and his claim of the text’s translatability constitute nothing less than a translational affront. Ever since his texts were first translated into other languages, Heidegger has been considered the “archetype of untranslatability” (Albert 2001, 194). Marini’s optimism was thus bound to scandalize Italian readers in particular since the argument for untranslatability has an august philosophical tradition in Italy, stretching back to Dante, Croce and Gentile. Given this history, Marini had to justify his translatorial confidence with particularly powerful evidence. In addition, because Chiodi’s earlier translation still enjoyed great popularity at the time of the new translation’s release, the new translation faced a monumental persuasive task to ensure its acceptance in the Italian philosophical discourse. Scholars had been working with Chiodi’s translation and the vocabulary it had developed for decades, and it had served as the basis for establishing translationally constructed terminological and “canonical equivalents” (“tradierte Äquivalente”) (Albrecht and Plack 2012). The new translation needed to prevail not only over an accepted translation but also over a language game (in Wittgenstein’s sense) with many participants, all of whom were directly or indirectly influenced by the philosophical success of the earlier translation. An effective strategy for legitimating (new) translations (even under such difficult conditions) is to claim to have collaborated with the author. Marini’s new Italian translation of *Sein und Zeit* is a particularly interesting case in this respect since he presented his project as a collaborative translation work; that is, as a translaboration, even though Heidegger died in 1976.

3. Unless otherwise specified, all Italian passages were originally translated into German by Lavinia Heller (L.H.), and subsequently translated from German to English by Charlton Payne (C.H.).

4. Repeated efforts have been made to use institutions to implement prescriptions for translators and established academic discourse on how to translate concepts and thus rein in the possibilities for translation, for example via the *Annali di Sociologia – Soziologisches Jahrbuch* or the EU project INTAS (International Association for the Promotion of Cooperation with Scientists from the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union) (Held, Marini, and Rizzoli 2000; Koch-Weser 2003). However, institutional legitimation of translations has never been a decisive factor for the acceptability of translations within the target discourse. For instance, the ‘unofficial’ French translation by Martineau (Heidegger 1985) enjoys no less terminological and conceptual ‘authority’ than Vezin’s (Heidegger 1986b) ‘official’ one, just as Martineau’s Heideggerian terminology still has an established place in philosophical discourse despite its unofficial status (Held, Marini, and Rizzoli 2000, 14; Albert 2001, 216, et passim).
The remainder of this article discusses the two ways in which Marini lends a translaborative character to *Essere e tempo*: via paratextual elements within the translated work and via a very specific translational method. Countering the concern that collaborative translation seduces the translator into hiding behind the author’s approval, and into surrendering his or her individual translational responsibility and creative freedom (Vanderschelden 1998, 29), I will discuss the extent to which any philosophical translation is fundamentally translaborative. In other words, I regard translaboration as a defining feature of philosophical translation practice.

2. Translating against philosophical and terminological resistance

Among the many reasons motivating Marini’s decision to produce a new Italian translation of Heidegger’s magnum opus, *Sein und Zeit*, is the fact that Chiodi’s translation revealed his partiality to French Existentialism. Chiodi had indeed oriented his translation toward French Heideggerian discourse (see Lazzari 2000, 118ff.; Marini 2000a, 17, 24–25, 2002, 2005, 2006b, 1403–1498). Through this orientation towards France, Chiodi had promoted a specific interpretation of Heidegger in Italy (Lazzari 2000, 118) that, according to Marini (2000a, 17, 24–25, 2002), had interpretatively and existentially obscured the view of *Sein und Zeit*. The purpose of this article is not to detail which of Chiodi’s individual translation solutions were influenced by French Existentialism (for instance, *gettato* or *gettatezza* for *Geworfenheit*, or *colpa* for *Schuld*). Instead, I take as my point of departure a more fundamental reproach Marini levels against Chiodi, and which also constitutes Marini’s point of departure for developing his own method of translation and strategy of legitimation.

Marini sees Chiodi’s existentialist predisposition as a fundamental problem that prevents him from doing justice to the complexity and systematicity of Heidegger’s terminology (Marini 2005, 137; see also Lazzari 2000). And yet, the need for a new translation does not seem to have been felt as strongly by others. In fact, Longanesi republished Chiodi’s *Essere e tempo* without substantial revisions only a year before the publication of Marini’s translation (Heidegger 2005, trans. Chiodi). Chiodi’s Heideggerian terminology has, moreover, shaped the language of Italian philosophy as a whole so persistently that its transmission in certain respects is no longer dependent on the reception of Chiodi’s translation: philosophy already speaks in Chiodi’s terms (Bianco 1989; Lazzari 2000; Lombardi 2006;
Marini had indeed anticipated that the philosophical and terminological persistence of his predecessor’s translation would pose an impediment to the reception and acceptance of his own work. This explains his unusual decision to acquaint the academic community with his translation methods and solutions to individual translation problems through a series of essays six years prior to the publication of his translation (Marini 2000a, 2000b, 2002; Lazzari 2000).

A further indication of Marini’s efforts to gain his readers’ trust is the strikingly extensive paratextual apparatus that ‘frames’ (and constitutes a quarter of) the volume. In addition to a comprehensive glossary totaling 100 pages and entitled “Lessico di ‘Essere e tempo’” (hereafter “Lessico”) (Marini 2006b), Marini also provides a detailed ‘accountability report’ or afterword entitled “Postfazione: Tradurre ‘Sein und Zeit’” (Marini 2006a) (hereafter “Postfazione”), which links to the glossary by way of references, reveals his translation methods and justifies his terminological decisions.

In the following section, I discuss how Marini uses these paratextual apparatus, and in particular the “Lessico” and “Postfazione,” to frame his translation as a translaboration, thereby embarking on a path of providing hermeneutic guidance to a philosophical reading.

3. (Translated) paratextual paths to legitimate hermeneutic guidance

Due to its notorious linguistic extravagance, Sein und Zeit was first received as a “scandalo linguistico” (Garroni 1989, 22). The size of the German Index zu Heidegger...
gers ‘Sein und Zeit’ (Index to Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’; hereafter *Index*) compiled by Hildegard Feick (1961), which is 121 pages long, speaks to this and heralds a terminological challenge for translators. It is also telling that most translations of *Sein und Zeit* include a glossary. In line with the translational norm of not translating glossaries and indexes but rather creating them on the basis of the main and newly translated text, the various translators of *Sein und Zeit* each composed their glossaries in different ways. In this context, Marini’s apparent relinquishing of his own compositional freedom, a point he makes explicit by stating that he oriented his work around the German *Index* (Marini 2006b, 1405), is striking. The legitimating value of this alignment not least results from the fact that the *Index*, which was published as an individual volume in 1961, thirty-four years after the publication of *Sein und Zeit* in 1927, itself counts as a classic of sorts.

This paratext owes its status as a classic not only to its utility but also to its specific intertextual relationship with *Sein und Zeit*. Heidegger’s co-presence is manifest in the *Index* in at least three ways. First, Feick dedicates the second edition of the *Index* to Heidegger: “TO WHOM IT BELONGS” (Feick 1968, v; capitalization in the original). Second, Heidegger’s presence enters the *Index* through an obituary of sorts that Heidegger wrote for Feick under the title “In Memory of Mrs. Dr. Hildegard Feick, a loyal co-worker [Mitarbeiterin] for many years” (emphasis added). In this introduction, placed before the preface to the third edition of the *Index* (1980), the philosopher thanks Feick for providing readers with “her inconspicuous yet reliable help while studying my writings” (Heidegger 1980, vi). This paratext, which Marini treats as a model to emulate, is thus authorized by Heidegger.

The third and, for its legitimating function, most fundamental intertextual relationship between the *Index* and *Sein und Zeit* is apparent in the design of the glossary. The use of terms is explained by way of other terms and entire sentences from Heidegger’s work. In other words, while the list of terms is compiled by Feick as editor, their use is illustrated as if by Heidegger himself. Furthermore, while the *Index* contains a few paraphrases, they are consistently phrased using Heideggerian vocabulary.

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7. A clear distinction between ‘glossary’ and ‘index’, relevant elsewhere, is unnecessary here. The *Index* is, in any case, a hybrid of the two. The reader not only finds in it explanations of the terms indexed, as one would expect from a glossary, but also, as with a classical index, the reader is referred to those passages in the main work in which key words appear. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, I will henceforth refer to the German *Index zu Heideggers ‘Sein und Zeit’* by the italicized and capitalized *Index*. Otherwise, I use ‘glossary’ and ‘index’ synonymously, unless the context suggests a distinction. All citations from the *Index* are translated by Charlton Payne (C.P.).
It is precisely this authorizing self-referentiality of the *Index* that Marini translates when he promises to have used “only Heidegger’s own sentences” to explain the listed keywords: “Dell’*Index* Feick abbiamo adottato il principio di usare soltanto frasi di Heidegger” (Marini 2006b, 1405; emphasis added). What compromises this guarantee of the explications’ origin in his glossary, however, is the fact that we are not actually dealing with Heidegger’s own sentences from *Sein und Zeit*, but with sentences from *Essere e tempo* translated by Marini. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Marini thus takes great pains to point out that Heidegger himself authorized the *Index* he used as a reference to create his own index, the “Lessico” (Marini 2006b). This is a sophisticated way for Marini to ‘earn’, as it were, Heidegger’s (indirect) approval of his own translational decisions. By translating this principle of self-referentiality of the *Index*, Marini translates its highly resilient foundations of legitimation, thus encouraging readers to abandon themselves to the concise 100-page glossary that refers (in contrast to the later editions of the *Index*) exclusively to *Essere e tempo* (1405). ⁸

In addition to aligning himself with this legitimating self-referentiality, Marini also translates the hermeneutic impact of the *Index*. A compositional peculiarity of the *Index* is its tendency to spatialize concepts. The majority of entries refer to other entries in the *Index*, thus implicitly suggesting which concepts are of particular philosophical importance. Furthermore, by juxtaposing expressions that are otherwise distributed across 400 pages of the main text, certain concepts enter into new relationships with others, and their grouping visually invokes specific philosophical connections. This spatial ‘condensation’ of Heidegger’s philosophy becomes denser with every revised and expanded edition.⁹ During his lifetime, Heidegger expressed fears about the hermeneutic effects of the *Index*. In the introduction to the third edition (1980), he justifies his initial hesitations about the *Index* project proposed by Feick by highlighting the unavoidable “danger” of an index that “emanates from the obvious temptation to do away with a sustained engagement with the work and to scan and parse it for the concepts in question” (Heidegger 1980, v). This danger is exacerbated paratextually in the fourth edition (1991), which, according to Ziegler (1991, xiii), renders the *Index* “henceforth appropriate for citing” thanks to careful revisions. It is, therefore, no longer nec-

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⁸ From the second edition (1968) onwards, the *Index* to *Sein und Zeit* also refers to later works by Heidegger, while the fourth edition (Feick and Ziegler 1991), which was revised by Susanne Ziegler, refers to all works edited by Heidegger (Ziegler 1991, xiii).

⁹ In the first edition (1961), the *Index* still spans 104 pages (without names), rising to 114 pages in the second edition (1968) and 121 pages in the fourth edition (1991).
necessary to search through over 400 pages for a particularly informative quotation for certain conceptual links; the Index presents the key passages ‘ready for use’.

By ‘translating’ this principle of spatialization and terminological condensation in the “Lessico,” Marini also translates the possibility of hermeneutic guidance personally authorized by Heidegger, and uses the glossary to compile the entries according to his understanding of Sein und Zeit and to create his own links between entries. This enables him to make his highly idiosyncratic translation decisions and innovative conceptual connections, vis-à-vis the interpretations of Sein und Zeit supported by Chiodi and other translators, clear to the reader. Marini’s conceptual spatializations are enlightening for even the most well-versed reader in German Heideggerian discourse. For example, in the entry for opportunità (Bewandtnis)\(^\text{11}\) Marini (2006a, 1462–1463) refers to the entry on significatività (Bedeutsamkeit).\(^\text{12}\) In translating Bewandtnis as opportunità, he uses the Latin etymology and metaphorical sense of ob-portunus: favorable winds that blow toward the harbor as a ‘horizon of significances’ (Bedeutsamkeit) where we can come to an agreement and understanding: “‘orientazione favorevole’ (come di vento che spinge verso il porto e non alla deriva) e quindi di ‘orizzonte di senso’ [Bedeutsamkeit] entro il quale si può ‘convenire’ su qualcosa” (Marini 2006a, 1273; see also Lombardi 2006, 16; Marini 2006b, 1463).\(^\text{13}\) This reveals a highly interesting metaphorological connection between the concepts of Bewandtnis and Bedeutsamkeit.

If readers follow the reference to significatività, they come to a double entry in which Marini (2006b, 1482) places the Heideggerian concepts of Bedeutsamkeit and woraufhin alongside each other: “significatività/ in-vista-di-cui (Bedeutsamkeit/woraufhin)” (literally, ‘significance/whereupon, or in view of’). This specific translation solution underscores the intrinsic connection between these two concepts in Heidegger’s philosophy (a connection that is not explicit in Feick’s Index), which is suggested by Marini’s spatialization (but which is lost in Chiodi’s translation):\(^\text{14}\) significance (Be-deutung) is, for Heidegger, always a significance

\(^{10}\) For a detailed discussion of the hermeneutic function of the Index and “Lessico” within Heideggerian discourse, see Heller (2019).

\(^{11}\) In Chiodi (Heidegger 2005) it is appagatività (literally: fulfillment) and in Stambaugh’s English translation (Heidegger 1996a) relevance.

\(^{12}\) In Chiodi (Heidegger 2005) it is significatività. In the English translations of Macquarrie and Robinson (Heidegger 2001) and Stambaugh (Heidegger 1996a) it is significance.

\(^{13}\) This interpretation corresponds with Gaos’ Spanish translation of Bewandtnis: conformidad (Heidegger 2002).

\(^{14}\) In Chiodi’s translation (Heidegger 2005): Bedeutsamkeit is significatività and woraufhin is ciò-rispetto-a-cui.
whereupon (woraufhin), that is to say, with a view towards (in Hinblick auf; in-vista-di), or in fore-sight (Heidegger 1996a, transl. Stambaugh) (Vor-sicht; pre-spezione), and with circumspection (Um-sicht; circumspectio). With the translational emphasis on the deictic character of Bedeutung (in the sense of ‘indication’ or ‘significance’ (Heidegger 1996a, transl. Stambaugh; Heidegger 2001, transl. Macquarrie and Robinson) and woraufhin (whereupon), Marini also preserves the connection of those concepts to the semantic field of the group “seeing/saying/indicate” (“sehen/sagen/(an)zeigen”) (Marini 2006a, 1384–1385, 2006b, 1485ff.). I return to this network of cross-references in Section 4.

Whenever Marini anticipates resistance to his translation choices due to established conventions, he marks the entry with an extra notation and refers the reader to the “Postfazione” (Marini 2006a). Marini reveals his translation methods and philosophical goals in the “Postfazione,” and demonstrates that they correspond to the ‘instructions for translation’ into Italian already contained within Sein und Zeit. For Marini, Sein und Zeit had, from the start, been written for Italians in this sense: “Sein und Zeit è già un testo per gli italiani” (‘Being and Time has been written for Italians’) (1265).

4. Translating in keeping with Heidegger’s ‘instructions’ for translation practice

In line with his criticism of Chiodi’s interpretational (existentialist) predisposition obscuring the complexity and systematicity of Heidegger’s terminology, Marini’s efforts to ‘liberate’ Heidegger from the old traditions of interpretation explicitly aim to open direct access to Sein und Zeit (rather than to suggest a new interpretation), just as, following Marini’s account of his own maxims of translation, Michelangelo liberated his statues from marble (Marini 2006a, 1265). He reassures readers that he is merely concerned with “removing [interpretative, L.H.] obstacles” that had previously obstructed access to Sein und Zeit within Italian philosophy (ibid.). For this salvage operation, Marini aligns himself with Heidegger’s own philosophical praxis, which he characterizes as “archaeological” in the articles he published prior to the publication of his Essere e tempo. Marini (2006a, passim) reminds readers that Heidegger consistently sought to call our attention to the historicity of language and to the burial of words under both their everyday and academic uses. Think, for example, of Heidegger’s ‘excavation’ of general expressions for philosophical use such as Ent-Fernung (“de-distancing”), Vor-Sicht (“fore-sight”), Ent-schlossenheit (“dis-closedness”), and Ent-deckung (“dis-

In addition, Heidegger wanted to highlight the Greek roots and successive Roman appropriations of the German (language of) philosophy (Von Herrmann 1992, 120). With this in mind, Lazzari (2000, 123) is convincing when he argues that the difficulty of translating Heidegger lies in the fact that his vocabulary is not a “terminologia ex novo” (literally, ‘a new terminology from scratch’).

It is in Heidegger’s “retrogression” (Lombardi 2006, 11) with regard to linguistic history that Marini sees relevant ‘instructions’ for the Italian translation of Sein und Zeit: just as Heidegger follows an archeological path back to his concepts by ‘excavating’ the original meaning of the words and retracing the roots of his (German) language in order to produce deep structural and conceptual cross-references, so too is the translator “invited” (“l’indicazione prevalente”) to a “traduzione storica” (“historical translation”) (Marini 2006a, 125):

Per la traduzione dal tedesco all’italiano una ‘traduzione storica’ sembra essere invece l’indicazione prevalente: nel senso dell’opportunità, se non della necessità che il traduttore, prima di inventare con inutile spreco di fantasia e ingegnosità situazioni di esperienze analoghe, reperisca gli elementi di traduzione già deposti nella memoria storica dell’italiano. (ibid.; emphasis added L.H.)

Instead of unnecessarily taxing the imagination (“di inventare con inutile spreco di fantasia”), Italian translators can or must (“nel senso della necessità”) retreat into their own language and (re)activate the (historical) possibilities of the Italian language (“reperire gli elementi di traduzione già depositati nella memoria storica dell’italiano”) (ibid.).

Marini (2006a) masterfully complies with this injunction. He produces a “traduzione storica” (125) that makes the Roman spirits of Latin and Greek origin, as well as the German goblins slumbering below Heidegger’s terminology and German philosophical language, jump out like a Tyrolean devil: “come un diavolletto tiroleso di carnevale (Krampus!)” (Marini 2002, 67; see also 2006a, 1319–1320. In order to render this ‘mongrel devil’ visible, Marini digs to the foundations of the Italian language. By doing so, he places the Italian and German texts in a recognizable relationship with one another (Marini 2006a, 1325). The bilingual format of the new translation (published by Mondadori) illustrates this


17. “For translation from German into Italian, the reference to ‘historical translation’ is the guiding principle: in the sense that the translator has the opportunity, if not the responsibility, to find those translated elements that are sedimented in the historical memory of the Italian language, and to do so before he wastes his imagination and ingenuity needlessly inventing analogous experiences.” (Trans. from Italian to German by L.H., from German to English by S.H.).
concern by presenting the Italian text on the right and the German on the left. Marini traces the German and Italian tangents of linguistic history and parallel constructions – sometimes in entire expressions, sometimes in the roots of words and sometimes in certain principles of word construction. In this way, he retraces Heidegger’s conceptual decisions back to the foundational linguistic layer that lies beneath the individual Italian or German terms. Against this backdrop, Marini’s translation method gives not only the Italian but also the German reader new insights into Heidegger’s philosophy and language. It thus unveils conceptual cross-references which frequent readers of Heidegger, who have grown accustomed to the philosopher’s unusual language, have come to overlook. The translation also provides profound insight into the linguistic constitution and “organicità terminological” (literally, ‘terminological integrity’) (Lombardi 2006, 12) of Sein und Zeit.

Several examples show just how Marini complies with Heidegger’s implicit instructions for an archeological translation method (see Table 1). For example, wherever Marini finds that Heidegger ‘marks’ conceptual distinctions by selecting terms of Latin, Greek or German origin, Marini conducts a retrogression (or reduction) of a term to, if possible, a Greek origin instead of a Latin one, or to antiquated forms of Italian vocabulary. This device illustrates Heidegger’s ‘historicizing’ formation of concepts for the reader. On this basis, Marini describes his own procedure as that of a “traduzione etnica” (literally, ‘ethnic translation’) (2006a, 1288ff.).

Table 1. Examples of ‘ethnic translation’

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<tr>
<th>Heidegger</th>
<th>Italian</th>
<th>English</th>
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<tr>
<td>determinieren</td>
<td>epistemico vs. scientifico</td>
<td>to determine, to define (M&amp;R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bestimmen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>temporal vs.</td>
<td>chronico vs. temporale</td>
<td>temporal (M&amp;R; S)</td>
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<tr>
<td>zeitlich</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretation</td>
<td>spiegazione vs.</td>
<td>to interpret (M&amp;R; S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vs. Auslegung</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geschichte vs.</td>
<td>storia vs. istoria</td>
<td>history vs. historiology (M&amp;R); history vs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historie</td>
<td>(antiquated form)</td>
<td>historiography (S)</td>
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a. Both of these expressions have Latin roots although spiegare is, like auslegen, more strongly rooted in colloquial speech than interpretare. Furthermore, s-spiegare reflects the morphological and metaphorological structure of aus-legen and reveals the sense of ‘display’ manifested in aus-legen. Chiodi (Heidegger 1953) marks the distinction by single quotes: ‘interpretazione’ (Interpretation) vs. interpretazione (Auslegung). The 2005 Volpi edition (Heidegger 2005) marks the distinction by inserting the corresponding German term in square brackets.
Particularly impressive is Marini’s systematic translation of the conceptual connections that are evoked purely linguistically in *Sein und Zeit*. Marini makes new connections by meticulously analyzing the micro-structural terminological units, which in turn acquire their power of suggestion through the principle of evidence. An example of this is Marini’s discussion of the translation of the root *Sicht* (sight) or *sehen* (to see), which carries significant conceptual weight for Heidegger (Marini 2006a, 1384–1385, 2006b, 1485ff.). Marini traces *Sicht*/sichten (sight/to sight) back to *sehen*, which is itself related to the Old High German *siht*/sehan (that which has been seen, to see), and points to the Old High German *zeigon* (to indicate, to show). In these examples, Marini identifies a ‘crossing’ of the Indo-European root *sek* (observe, follow with one’s eyes) with the root *deik* (say, indicate/show, tell). For the translation of the German root *Sicht*, Marini selects the Latin *spectio* to communicate the semantic field *sehen*/sagen/(an)zeigen (see/say/indicate) etymologically implied in *Sicht*: *spezione*/dizione/[in]dicazione. Compared with the translation choices in other translations of *Sein und Zeit*, the consistency of Marini’s method is all the more apparent (see Table 2).

With his “traduzione storica” and “sistematica” (Marini 2006a, 1337), Marini reproduces the etymologically grounded referential connections of the origins of the Heideggerian concepts that had been lost in Chiodi’s translation when the latter, rather laboriously, rendered *Umsicht* with *visione ambientale preveggente* and *Durchsichtigkeit* with *trasparenza* (Heidegger 2006, 1486–1487). *Sein und Zeit* establishes a connection between *Bedeutung*/significatività (in Latin *significans*, *signum*) and *woraufhin*/in-vista-di-cui, which Marini foregrounds in his translation choice (see Section 3). How fundamental this connection really is only becomes apparent against the background of Marini’s interpretation of the root *Sicht* as a ‘crossing’ of the Indo-European root *sek* (observe, follow with the eyes) with the root *deik* (to say, indicate, show, tell), as well as against the background of the systematic translation of the Heideggerian conceptual relationship that is, literally, rooted in the semantic field of *Sicht* (sight).

5. **Conclusion: Philosophical translation as translaboration**

Having traced the ways in which Marini evokes a translaborative situation with rhetorical and visual sleight of hand, in this section, I conclude by considering the extent to which Marini’s translation should be understood as a form of translaboration that results in a new, hybrid text. Specifically, I argue that the translaborative character of this work is a philosophical feature of this translation on two levels: first, at the level of collaboration between the translator (Marini) and
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<th>Heidegger</th>
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<th>English</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mi = Marini (Heidegger 2006)</td>
<td>Mu = Martineau (Heidegger 1985); V = Vezin (Heidegger 1986b); B&amp;dW = Boehm and de Waelhens (Heidegger 1964)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>C = Chiodi (Heidegger 2005)</td>
<td></td>
<td>M&amp;R = Macquarrie and Robinson (Heidegger 2001); S = Stambaugh (Heidegger 1996a)</td>
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<tr>
<th>seeht</th>
<th>specere/spectrum/ spectio/spezione (Mi); visione (C)</th>
<th>visée (V)</th>
<th>sight (M&amp;R)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zuschauer</td>
<td>spettatore (Mi; C) spectateur (Mu)</td>
<td></td>
<td>spectator (M&amp;R; S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aussehen</td>
<td>aspetto (Mi; C) apparence (B&amp;dW); aspect (Mu); aspect (V)</td>
<td></td>
<td>way they look (M&amp;R); outward appearance (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umsicht</td>
<td>circumspectio (Mi); visione ambientale prèvoyance (B&amp;dW); circon-spection (Mu); discernation (V)</td>
<td></td>
<td>circumspection (M&amp;R; S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rücksicht</td>
<td>rispetto (Mi); riguardo (C) l’égard (B&amp;dW); par rapport a (Mu); l’égard (V)</td>
<td></td>
<td>consideredness (M&amp;R; S); with regard to (M&amp;R); with reference to (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rücksichtslosigkeit</td>
<td>mancanza di rispetto (Mi); mancanza di riguardo (C) l’égard se muer en totale ‘indiscrétion’ (B&amp;dW); absence d’égard (V)</td>
<td></td>
<td>unconsideredness (M&amp;R; S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durchsichtigkeit</td>
<td>perspicuità (Mi); trasparenza (C) translucidité (Mu); transparance (V); une vue claire, transparance (B&amp;dW)</td>
<td></td>
<td>transparence (M&amp;R; S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undurchsichtigkeit</td>
<td>non perspicuità (Mi); opacità (C) opacité (B&amp;dW; Mu; V)</td>
<td></td>
<td>opaque (M&amp;R); opacity (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hingehen</td>
<td>inspectio (Mi); guardare a (C) regard (B&amp;dW); avisement (Mu); consideration (V)</td>
<td></td>
<td>looking at (M&amp;R); looking at (S)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heidegger</th>
<th>Italian</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vorsicht</strong></td>
<td>pre-spezazione (Mi); pre-visionse (C)</td>
<td>vue préalable, pré-voyance (B&amp;dW; Mu); visée préalable (V)</td>
<td>fore-sight (M&amp;R; S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ansicht</strong></td>
<td>veduta (Mi); punti di vista (C)</td>
<td>avis (Mu; V)</td>
<td>view (M&amp;R); opinion (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ansichtig</strong></td>
<td>entrare nella spectio (Mi); raffigurarsi (C)</td>
<td>s’aviser (Mu); apercevoir (V)</td>
<td>to catch sight (M&amp;R; S)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Rudolf Boehm and Alphonse de Waelhens’s 1964 translation only refers to §9–§44.
b. In Macquarrie and Robinson’s (2001, 517) “Glossary of German Expressions” there is a particularly interesting comment on the use of the root Sicht: “Note: with a few obvious exceptions, the word ‘sight’ is not used in translating compounds involving ‘Sicht.’”
c. Here there is no consistent translation choice. In another passage, for instance, it is rendered as in base a (Heidegger 2010, 242), in riferimento a (39).
d. In Martineau’s translation (Heidegger 1985) it is left untranslated.
e. In Boehm and De Waelhens’s translation (Heidegger 1964) there is no consistent translation choice.

author (Heidegger) and second, at the level of collaboration among (Heidegger) translators worldwide.

Because translators necessarily produce a new text by taking up an already existing text, one could argue that collaboration is immanent to translation. This fundamental form of collaboration is usually dismissed as uninteresting in most discussions of collaborative translation, not only because of its ubiquity but also because of the one-sidedness of the collaboration whenever the author does not actively participate (see, e.g., Monti and Schneyder 2018). The case discussed in this paper, however, shows that active participation is not the most decisive factor in determining whether a translation event (Chesterman 2009) develops into translaboration. Rather, it is the role the translator grants the author and the authority that he or she permits the author within the translation event, that is key. In the philosophical context, authors are generally assigned a highly authoritative role. In fact, the history of translation practices shows that the ‘co-presence’ of the foreign author has long been a characteristic of the translation of philosophical texts, even if such practices are only rarely explicitly stylized as philosophical translation methods, as in Schleiermacher (1963). Even in periods when there was a particularly strong expectation of matching the target language system’s goût (taste), that is, when translation is expected to be invisible, as in seventeenth-century France, philosophical texts still exhibited resistance to the social pressure towards domesticating appropriation. We must, of course, be careful not to over-
generalize this. However, we can safely assume that the inherently collaborative character of translation stands out in the philosophical domain when compared with other translation contexts. Considering this fact alone, the basic form of translaboration, which is often written off as unworthy of special attention, can be conceived as a relevant research topic in translation history and theory, at least in the case of the translation of philosophical texts. In this context, translaboration is more than a way of managing complex practical translation problems (see, e.g., Holz-Mänttäri 1984; Dickinson and Risku 2009; Jansen and Wegener 2013; Cordingley and Frigau Manning 2017) – it also fulfils a philosophical function.

At first glance, it may seem that Marini’s almost obsessive rhetorical evocation of a collaborative translation situation was solely intended to legitimate his new translation and provide a way of sharing the burden of responsibility. However, the analysis of his paratexts and translation methods reveals that Marini maintained a serious commitment to the translaborative situation; he both evoked and engaged in a productive Zwiegespräch (Heidegger 1963), or dialogue, with the philosopher. His translation and philosophical creativity seems to have first developed out of this dialogue. For, as Heidegger demands of translators in The Saying of Anaximander (Heidegger 2002) and What Is Called Thinking? (Heidegger 1968), Marini “allow[s himself] to be drawn into, and to listen to, that which comes to language in the saying” without any “inappropriate preconceptions” (Heidegger 2002, 250) about what the text says of its own accord. When Heidegger describes translating Parmenides, he asserts: “Every interpretation is a dialogue with the work, and with the saying” (178). Following this model, Marini “pays heed” to what “comes to language” (“zur Sprache kommt”) (266–267) in the text of Sein und Zeit. It is a peculiar aspect of Marini’s translation that he also translates what “comes to language” in Sein und Zeit through the linguistic and translation composition of the philosophy at hand, so that his work can in turn ‘be instructed’ by it. This translation method corresponds very closely to Heidegger’s own maxim that translation must be “faithful to the word” (“wortgetreue Übersetzung”) (Heidegger 1963, 326; Heidegger 2002 trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes 266–267; emphasis added) – an approach that Heidegger differentiates from mere literal translation (Wörtlichkeit), which he considers philosophically worthless. It is in this sense that Marini submitted his creative work to the guid-

18. In cases where philosophical classics, such as the Platonic dialogues, are translated for an educated, non-specialist public, as they were in seventeenth-century France, such translations have followed similar translational norms of elegance as literary texts, goût (taste) and benséance (propriety), and have left little room for the author’s own voice. The normative stability of the philosophical text type is remarkable from the perspective of translation theory. For an in-depth, historically framed discussion of a specifically philosophical culture of translation, see Gipper and Heller (2020).
ance of Heidegger, not only as an author to be translated but also a translator in his own right (2006a, 1289, 2000b, 108). By forging a translation that is faithful to the word, Marini wrests something of value from philosophy’s argument for untranslatability, founded in the conviction that philosophical thought does not exist independently of its linguistic form: he translates the Heideggerian conceptual system complete with its linguistic ‘rootedness’.

Without recognizing the translaboration between Marini and Heidegger, Marini’s eccentric parlance will be perceived as disruptive to the philosophical reading. It is in this spirit that Biuso (2006) accuses Marini of having translated like an engineer. He labels Marini’s terminology as “technicistic,” “artificial,” “discordant” and “stunted” in comparison to Chiodi’s translation, which he praises for its “clarity,” “beauty” and “melody” (Curcio 2005, 319), especially in Volpi’s revision. Marini, for his part, is aware of the potential for his procedure to cause irritation. He expressly avoids striving for aesthetic “smoothness” (Marini 2006a, 1271), and instead aims to make his readers more aware of the specific linguistic or translational composition of Heidegger’s philosophy. To this end, he pushes the Italian language to its systematic limits (1252–1253). And yet, he does not imitate Heidegger’s stylistic esotericism. Furthermore, Marini’s efforts to translate the very principle of Heideggerian linguistic constructions and to legitimate this effort by defending it against other translation choices in his paratextual apparatus, achieves an additional function: he introduces the reader to the fact that German and Italian developed from similar (Latin and Greek) origins but proceeded in different directions (1254ff.), and that these developments in linguistic history have engendered specific translational cross-references between particular (philosophical) languages. These handed-down translational references, which are condensed in the form of canonical equivalents in academic discourse, are finally revealed to be contingent in Marini’s (translation-)historical perspective. Through a (translation-)historical lens, bidirectional (translational) references can be buried under linguistic and translation habits. Yet those references can be traced and reactivated as long as the inertia of linguistic and reflective habits can be overcome in the relevant philosophical community. In keeping with Heidegger’s concept of translation as an “encounter with a foreign language for the sake of appropriating one’s own language” (Heidegger 1996b, 66), Marini offers the reader insight into the historical layers and translation connections between his own and others’ (philosophical) language in order to achieve a higher level of (historical) linguistic consciousness. A new linguistic perspective of a well-known, widely transmitted (and translated) text certainly also always promises to offer new philosophical access to it. In this sense, Marini’s effort should be understood as an effort towards philosophical emancipation from the traditions of reflection.
that pervade philosophical discourses through influential translations (see Marini 2006a, 1260).

Marini explicitly sees the purpose of his translation work as contributing to the eventual emancipation of Italian philosophy from French philosophy, and ultimately from German philosophy as well (see Heller 2013, 2015, 2017). Like Schleiermacher (1963), he believes that creative ‘linguistic work’ leads to the spiritual innovation and independence of cultures, not the mere importing of new content. The sustainable and philosophically productive effects of translation thus do not emanate from philosophers being translated, but from the linguistic work of translators and from their discovery of new translation possibilities; that is, new possibilities of (philosophical) linguistic references to different languages and philosophies. However, Marini is not only addressing Italian readers. His translation challenge to engage in emancipatory relational linguistic work, in Heidegger’s sense, instead seems to be directed at the international community of (Heidegger) translators and philosophers.

What stands out, particularly in the “Lessico,” is the frequent reference not only to Chiodi’s translation choices, but also to the translation choices of Sein und Zeit’s translators working in other languages. At first glance, these references serve the purpose of either distancing Marini from certain translation choices or of seeking legitimation from other translators. Against the background of Marini’s linguistic-relational repositioning of Sein und Zeit and of his effort to translate not only Heidegger’s philosophy, but also to reveal its linguistic and translational conditions of realization, the recursive reference to other translation choices may, essentially, be understood as a hermeneutic memento: (philosophical) understanding cannot be conclusive. This does not amount to a surrender on the part of the practicing translator. On the contrary, inconclusiveness spurs us on to ever new possibilities of translational reference and thus the willingness to give up our habits of reflection. This translational-hermeneutic figure of thought is not new; we encounter it in various forms in the philosophy of Schleiermacher, Benjamin and Derrida, and in Cassin’s (2004) Vocabulaire Européen des philosophies dictionnaire des intraduisibles. A unique trait of Marini’s Essere e tempo is that it engages pragmatically and philosophically with this unsettling inconclusiveness. Instead of overshadowing or relativizing inconclusiveness, Marini makes the reader aware of the possibilities other languages offer for tuning into the same language and philosophy that he himself is tuning into in Italian. At the same time, he shows the reader once more that unutilized possibilities could appear within one’s own language through other translational references, which await their (re)activation for linguistic and philosophical creativity.

Marini (2002, 2006b) thus invites translators of philosophy to observe other translators and to find inspiration in others’ decisions as part of the search for
(unutilized) possibilities within their languages, and in turn to offer readers insights into newly found linguistic possibilities for developing a philosophical praxis. For this reason, he considers the pursuit of philosophical translation – which is to say philosophy itself – as ideally taking the form of international translaboration. We can thus see that Marini’s aspirations for translational and philosophical emancipation aim not for isolation but for the discovery of productive difference, for it is difference which enables dialogue in the first place. Correspondingly, international philosophical collaboration is only possible under the condition of difference, or, more precisely, under the reciprocal retraceability of (linguistic, conceptual, conceptual-historical) differences. A philosophical translation must therefore be capable of achieving more than making a text accessible internationally. A translation only acquires philosophical character when it can give insight into its specifically (philosophical) linguistic, that is, dialogic, relationship to the source text. This specificity can, of course, only be recognized against the background of the most thorough knowledge of other translations. In this sense, Marini’s Essere e tempo not only presents us with a translaboration, but also invites us to join in further translaborations. And it does so not only in the service of translation practice, but in the service of philosophy as well. The fact that there can be no more intense hermeneutic engagement with a (philosophical) text than when translating it, and of going beyond that and comparing it with other translations, can be explained not only by Walter Benjamin’s (1963) thought on the matter, but by a practical experience that anyone can embark on. The history of philosophy only underwent its translational turn a few years ago (Gipper and Heller 2020) – a disciplinary translaboration between translation studies and philosophy might have accelerated such reformation. What Marini’s work seems to demand of the practice of philosophy, as well as of philosophical translation, is a translaborative turn.

(Translation by Spencer Hawkins)
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Publication history

Date received: 11 May 2020
Date accepted: 11 May 2020
Published online: 15 June 2020